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INTRODUcTION
Voluntary associations play an integral role in the United States
and North Carolina. In their various forms, they leverage social
capital,' build the foundation of democracy,2 and even mobilize the
public for political action.3 They are an important part of the way
individuals interact with society,' and they also contribute
significantly to the economy.' The definition is broad and includes
any "gathering of people for a common purpose; the persons so
joined."' The concept of a voluntary association stems from the
1. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 214
(Sanford Kessler ed., Stephen D. Grant trans., Hackett Publishing 2000)
("Nothing... merits our attention more than the intellectual and moral associations of
America .... In order that men remain or become civilized, it is necessary that the art of
forming associations grow and be improved among them in proportion as the equality of
conditions increases."); BEYOND TOCQUEVILLE: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE SOCIAL
CAPITAL DEBATE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1 (Bob Edwards et al. eds., 2001)
("[T]he debate... attaches tremendous significance to the role of voluntary associations
in society. Participation in such groups is said to produce social capital, sometimes linked
to high levels of social trust. Social capital in turn is conceived as a crucial national
resource for promoting collective action for the common good."); Kenneth Newton, Social
Capital and Democracy, 40 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 575 (1997) (exploring different forms
of social capital and refining the theoretical question of leverage based on these
distinctions).
2. See, e.g., John C. Scott, Jr., Membership and Participation in Voluntary
Associations, 22 AM. SOC. REV. 315, 315 (1957) ("The fact that pioneers through the
agency of voluntary associations founded, settled and developed areas of the continent is,
indeed, evidence of the early influence of this institution upon American life.").
3. See, e.g., Frank R. Baumgartner & Jack L. Walker, Survey Research and
Membership in Voluntary Associations, 32 AM. J. FOR POL. SCI. 908, 926 (1988) ("[G]roup
involvement has a strong impact on [members'] likelihood to vote and to engage in other
forms of conventional political action. The group system is a vast training ground for
political activity and an important pathway through which citizens are linked with the
political parties and the formal institutions of government.").
4. See NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES
OF PLURALISM IN AMERICA 4 (1998) ("Membership in voluntary associations is
formative, sometimes powerfully so, and the currents of associational rise and decline have
added drama if the moral tides of American liberal democracy can be said to shift with
them.").
5. See, e.g., Leon N. Lindberg, John L. Campbell & J. Rogers Hollingsworth,
Economic Governance and the Analysis of Structural Change in the American Economy, in
GOVERNANCE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 3,15 (John L. Campbell et al. eds., 1991)
("[P]olitical scientists and sociologists have shown that collective action, in the form of
voting, social movements, and voluntary associations... are an important part of
economic and political life, and that these phenomena play an important role in obtaining
stability and social control.").
6. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 141 (9th ed. 2009). Black's redirects "voluntary
associations" to "associations," and also notes different forms of associations, including
homeowner, nonprofit, and professional associations. Id.
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fundamental "right to associate," which is protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.' Voluntary associations come in many
shapes and sizes, encompassing national and local sports leagues,
professional groups and societies, trade unions, political parties, and
associations set up for competition among its members.
Laws governing voluntary associations function at the state level,
with some state legislatures choosing to codify precedent through
statutes and others allowing case law to stand on its own.' In light of
the critical significance of voluntary associations to individuals and
society as a whole, clear laws that foster stability and predictability
are crucial. Unfortunately, many jurisdictions, including North
Carolina, have indefinite common law standards allowing judicial
second-guessing of voluntary associations; as a result, judicial
intervention in the internal decisions of voluntary associations is all
too common. Without solid guidelines and instructions, lower courts
will continue to interfere with the decisions of internal dispute
resolution systems, and the resulting litigation costs will drain capital
from voluntary associations.
Crystal Coast Tournament ("Tournament") is one such example
of a large, influential voluntary association in North Carolina. The
Tournament, a charitable association, takes place once a year in
Morehead City, and attracts fishing crews from across the country.'
The Crystal Coast Tournament functions through rules that govern
the relationship between members and the association-in this case,
7. See U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV. Freedom of association does not receive direct
textual support in the amendments, but the Supreme Court of the United States has
consistently given the right substantial constitutional protection. See generally NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 449-50 (1958) (holding a right to associate is private and free from
state scrutiny of membership lists); Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and
Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1964) ("Associational rights ... are not derived
solely from the first amendment. Rather they are implied in the whole constitutional
framework for the protection of individual liberty in a democratic society."); Jason
Mazzone, Freedom's Association, 77 WASH. L. REv. 639 (2002) (discussing the
development of freedom of association and proposing a new approach to constitutional
protection of associations).
8. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-76 (West 2012) (stating when members of
a voluntary association can sue and be sued under Connecticut law); ALA. CODE § 27-34-
16 (LexisNexis 2011) (regulating when an unincorporated voluntary association can
incorporate). But see Lough v. Varsity Bowl, Inc., 243 N.E.2d 61, 63 (Ohio 1968) (creating
the jurisdictional requirement for review of an internal decision by a voluntary association,
and not referencing any state statute); Topp v. Big Rock Found., Inc., - N.C. _, _, 736
S.E.2d 173, 174 (2013) (per curiam) (adopting a version of the Lough standard and not
referencing any state statute).
9. See BIG ROCK BLUE MARLIN TOURNAMENT, http://www.thebigrock.com/ (last
visited Sept. 5, 2014) (providing information on the Tournament generally, including rules,
dates, a list of participants from a variety of states, entry fees, and location).
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the fishermen and the Tournament Rules Committee and Board of
Directors. 0 Any individual wishing to participate in the Tournament
is required to pay a substantial fee and must agree to abide by the
Tournament rules."
The Tournament gave rise to significant controversy in 2010
when the crew that caught the largest blue marlin in Tournament
history was disqualified, stripping the crewmembers of their record-
breaking title and almost one million dollar reward.12 Instead of
pointing to an unfair competitive advantage, or any showing of deceit
or bad faith on the part of the crew, the Tournament Rules
Committee based its disqualification decision solely on the failure of
one member-in charge of thawing and rigging the bait'a-to hold an
active recreational fishing license at the time of the catch.14 This took
North Carolina media by storm, and much of the commentary
sympathized with the members of the disqualified crew.15 Angry at
10. See Topp v. Big Rock Found., Inc., - N.C. App. -, _, 726 S.E.2d 884, 886(2012), rev'd and remanded per curiam, - N.C. _, 736 S.E.2d 173, 173-74 (2013) (holding
that there was a material question of fact regarding whether the disqualification was
arbitrary).
11. See 2013 Official Tournament Rules, BIG ROCK BLUE MARLIN TOURNAMENT,
http://www.thebigrock.com/2013-official-tournament-rules (last visited Sept. 5, 2014)(displaying the Tournament Rules for the 2013 Tournament and announcing the members
of the Rules Committee).
12. See Topp, - N.C. App. at -, 726 S.E.2d at 886-87; see also Anne Blythe, Big
Rock Fishermen Still Trying to Reel in the Prize That Got Away, NEWS & OBSERVER, Jan.
7, 2013, http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/01/07/2589771/big-rock-fishermen-still-
trying.html ("A fishing crew from 2010's Big Rock Blue Marlin Tournament is still trying
to reel in the one that got away-not the 883-pound marlin they hooked, but the $910,000
prize for the biggest catch.").
13. Wann, the member who did not have a recreational fishing license, was
specifically in charge of thawing the frozen fish used as bait and then attaching the fish to
the rig, or hook, that is used for catching marlin. Topp, - N.C. App. at -, 726 S.E.2d at
886.
14. Topp, - N.C. App. at -, 726 S.E.2d at 887. Wann, a twenty-two-year-old college
student, claimed that he was unaware that he needed an individual fishing license and
instead assumed that the boat contained a blanket fishing license that covered him. See
Catherine Kozak, Citation Mate Has Charges Dismissed in Big Rock Tournament
Controversy, ISLAND FREE PRESS (Aug. 2, 2013), http://islandfreepress.org/
2013 Archives/08.02.2013-CitationMateHasChargesDismissedInBigRockToumament
Controversy.html ("In interviews with several news outlets, Wann said that he has
assumed that the Citation possessed a blanket fishing license, and that no one on the boat
told him that he was required to have his own fishing license.").
15. See, e.g., Fishing Competition Lands in North Carolina's High Court, $1M On
Line, FOXNEWS.COM (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/01/08/fishing-
competition-lands-in-north-carolina-high-court-1m-on-line/ ("But their luck soured. The
boat's owners landed in a fight for the $910,000 in prize money that continued Tuesday
with arguments to North Carolina's Supreme Court."); Annie Gowen, Fishing License
Dispute Costs Virginia Team $1 Million Prize in Outer Banks Big Rock Blue Marlin
Contest, WASH. POST. (June 24, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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the result, the crewmembers filed a claim for breach of contract
against the Crystal Coast Tournament."6
The Tournament Rules Committee's controversial decision
presented the Supreme Court of North Carolina with its first
opportunity to address the standard for judicial intervention in the
decisions of voluntary associations that function primarily to operate
tournaments. Unfortunately, instead of creating a predictable and
workable standard, the court issued a three-sentence, per curiam
decision reversing the court of appeals' decision to grant summary
judgment in favor of the Tournament "[flor the reasons stated in the
dissenting opinion.""
This Recent Development argues that the Supreme Court of
North Carolina has provided little guidance to lower courts tasked
with reviewing the internal rulemaking functions of voluntary
associations. Rather than first addressing the threshold question of
whether judicial intervention was even appropriate, the court looked
directly to common law contract principles and determined that
summary judgment was improper.'" By requiring courts to impose
contract principles before analyzing the threshold question of
jurisdiction, the court has effectively eliminated all of the benefits of
the noninterference standard that it purported to adopt. Furthermore,
the court did not clearly define whether this standard presents
questions of law or fact. Instead, the court employed a competitive
advantage inquiry, which is problematic when applied across the
broad context of voluntary associations." Given these flaws in the
court's analysis and conclusion, and the consequential rise of
dyn/content/article/2010/06/23/AR2010062305322_2.html (quoting Wann, "I feel bad");
Tim Hall, Big Rock President Says Fishing Without License Is a Substantial Violation,
WRALSPORTSFAN.COM (Jun. 23, 2010), http://www.wralsportsfan.com/fishing/story
17836005/ ("Seems like a harsh penalty for a small crime.").
16. Topp, - N.C. App. at -, 726 S.E.2d at 887.
17. Topp v. Big Rock Found., Inc., _ N.C._ ,_, 736 S.E.2d 173, 174 (2013).
18. See Topp, - N.C. App. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 893 (Hunter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("I would also hold that . .. Plaintiffs raised a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether their disqualification from the Big Rock Blue Marlin Tournament was
arbitrary and thus a material breach of the parties' contract ..... ).
19. See id at _, 726 S.E.2d at 889 (majority opinion) ("Whether a board's decision is
to be disturbed due to arbitrariness, fraud, or collusion is a question of law."). But see
Topp, - N.C. App. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 892 (Hunter, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (emphasizing the "genuine issue of material fact" created by a decision's
arbitrariness). The Supreme Court of North Carolina explicitly adopted the dissent, which
purported to adopt the same standard as the majority. The contrast between the language
employed by the majority and dissent regarding questions of law and fact creates
substantial ambiguity as to what the real standard actually is. See infra Part III.B (arguing
that treating the question of whether a voluntary association's decision is arbitrary as a
question of law will promote more stability and predictability in the court system).
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litigation costs in the area, this Recent Development encourages
clearer guidelines for lower courts. Another alternative is
differentiating between types of voluntary associations, which might
allow the court to reconcile the heightened judicial intervention in a
tournament context with such a deferential standard.
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I explores the background
law of voluntary associations, the general principle of judicial
noninterference, and the limited exceptions to this principle. Part II
discusses the North Carolina Court of Appeals' decision Topp v. Big
Rock Foundation, Inc.,20 with particular emphasis on the dissent
adopted by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. Part III argues that
the court's application of the Topp test flows from a muddled
conception of voluntary associations, is in complete contrast to the
policy reasons underpinning the test, and is rooted in reasoning that
cannot be applied across the broad spectrum of voluntary
associations. Further, the court's endorsement of the court of appeals'
dissent has rendered the law governing judicial intervention in
voluntary associations ambiguous and unpredictable. Finally, Part IV
offers recommendations for providing clear and workable guidelines
for lower courts, which this Recent Development argues are in dire
need given the current state of this area of law in North Carolina.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS
A. Background
Voluntary associations are an integral part of American society,
so much so that the Supreme Court of the United States has held that
the Constitution protects the private right to associate.' Voluntary
associations are broad and diverse, encompassing a variety of
unincorporated entities, such as sports leagues like the National
Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA"),22 the National Football
League ("NFL"),23  local bowling leagues,24  homeowners
20. - N.C. App. , 726 S.E.2d 884 (2012).
21. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., McAdoo v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, _ N.C. App. _, , 736
S.E.2d 811 (2013) (treating the NCAA as a voluntary association).
23. See, e.g., Oakland Raiders v. Nat'l Football League, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 266, 269 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2005) (treating the NFL as a voluntary association).
24. See, e.g., Lough v. Varsity Bowl, Inc., 243 N.E.2d 61 (Ohio 1968) (treating a
bowling league as a voluntary association).
2124 [Vol. 92
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associations,25 and charitable organizations. 26 Associations can be
both for profit and not for profit.27
Over time, voluntary associations have evolved and assumed
elements commonly found in corporations. Corporate elements
including bylaws, regulations, and constitutions often define and
tailor the association's overarching purpose.28 In general, these
reciprocal restraints function as contracts between the individual
members and the associations to which they belong.29  An
association's bylaws will often include at least a reference to any rules
that govern the members, including any agreement to submit to an
internal dispute resolution body.30 The bylaws of larger voluntary
associations also often describe conduct standards for its members
and lay out the consequences for violating these standards.
Voluntary associations can function solely to operate
tournaments, like the Big Rock Blue Marlin Tournament. It is
important to distinguish these voluntary associations from
tournaments that purely function as contracts. For example, in Jones
v. Capitol Broadcasting Co. ,32 a voluntary association did not control
the tournament that the Plaintiffs entered into, and thus the Supreme
Court of North Carolina correctly held that the Plaintiffs stated a
claim for breach of contract.33 The key difference between the two
models is often the presence of an internal dispute resolution body.
Whereas the tournament in Jones v. Capitol Broadcasting Co. did not
require competitors to agree to any kind of dispute resolution,
voluntary associations often do.34
25. See generally, Pine Knoll Ass'n, Inc. v. Cardon, 126 N.C. App. 155, 484 S.E.2d 446
(1997) (treating a property owners association as a voluntary association and applying
applicable precedents).
26. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59B (2013) (regulating nonprofit associations).
27. 7 C.J.S. Associations § 3 (2014).
28. 7 C.J.S. Associations § 14 (2014).
29. Id.
30. See 6 AM. JUR. 2D Associations and Clubs § 7 (2014); 7 C.J.S. Associations § 16
(2014); see also NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, Art. 6 (Aug. 1, 2013) [hereinafter
MANUAL], http://www.ncaapublications.com/DownloadPublication.aspx?download=
D114.pdf (devoting an entire article to discussing "institutional control" in its bylaws).
31. See, e.g., MANUAL, supra note 30, at Art. 10 ("Ethical Conduct") and Art. 10.4
("Disciplinary Action").
32. 128 N.C. App. 271,495 S.E.2d 172 (1998).
33. Id. at 273, 495 S.E.2d at 174-75.
34. Id.
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B. When Can Courts Intervene?
There is a strong tendency amongst higher courts in all
jurisdictions to adopt standards that defer to the decisions of
voluntary associations and to refrain from interfering with these
internal rules." Strong policy reasons support this deferential trend,
including respecting the autonomy and expertise of the voluntary
association,36 avoiding a heavy burden on the court through excessive
litigation, and promoting predictability and stability." This tendency
results in a legal doctrine that treats deference to voluntary
associations as the default rule, and intervention is only limited to a
few, specifically announced exceptions.3 8 These exceptions are
worded slightly differently depending on the jurisdiction, but courts
generally focus on (a) the lack of due process afforded by the
voluntary associations to their members, or (b) a showing of some
kind of fraud, collusion, bad faith, or arbitrariness. 9 Most
jurisdictions also require the plaintiff to show that the voluntary
35. See 7 C.J.S. Associations § 82 (2014), ("Courts must guard against unduly
interfering with an organization's autonomy by substituting judicial judgment for that of
the organization in an area where the competence of the court does not equal that of the
organization.").
36. As the California Court of Appeals described in a case dealing with the NFL's
duties to its members,
[g]iven the unique and specialized nature of this association's business-the
operation of a professional football league-there is significant danger that
judicial intervention in such disputes will have the undesired and unintended
effect of interfering with the League's autonomy in matters where the NFL and
its commissioner have much greater competence and understanding than the
courts.
Oakland Raiders v. Nat'l Football League, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 266, 284 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005).
37. See id. at 283 ("[A court's] determination not to intervene [in the internal
rulemaking functions of an association] reflects [its] judgment that the resulting burdens
on the judiciary outweigh the interests of the parties at stake. One concern in such cases is
that judicial attempts to construe ritual or obscure rules and laws of private organizations
may lead the courts into... the dismal swamp." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
38. In California this default rule is referred to as the "abstention doctrine." See id. at
266. The doctrine mandates that courts defer to a voluntary association unless a
"particular instance in which judicial intervention would be appropriate" applies. Id. at 283.
39. Different jurisdictions word these different exceptions differently. The North
Carolina Court of Appeals has articulated the due process exception for voluntary
associations as more limited than violations by the state and only requires that the
association "(1) follow [its] own internal rules and procedures, and (2) adhere to principles
of 'fundamental fairness' by providing notice and opportunity to be heard." McAdoo v.
Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, - N.C. App. -, -, 736 S.E.2d 811, 813 (2013). But see infra
Part III.A, which highlights the Topp decision's lack of clarity in regard to the
arbitrariness exception.
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association's decision somehow implicated his property rights, which
may include the right to continued membership.'
North Carolina has also formally adopted this principle of
judicial noninterference in the internal dispute resolution of voluntary
associations. Even before the Supreme Court of North Carolina was
presented with the Crystal Coast Tournament issue, the court of
appeals expressed that "[i]t is well established that courts will not
interfere with the internal affairs of voluntary associations"4 1 and that
North Carolina follows this "well-established rule."42
Although the supreme court eventually confirmed a
"deferential" standard for review of decisions made by tournament-
oriented voluntary associations, its application of this standard was
far from accommodating. The standard adopted by the supreme
court, as articulated in the court of appeals' dissent,4 3 on its face
appears to extend this rationale and deferential trend." The dissent
articulated that where a voluntary association has provided for
dispute resolution among members, the courts should not review a
final and conclusive action unless the decision was (a) inconsistent
with due process; (b) arbitrary; (c) fraudulent; or (d) arrived at
through collusion.45 Under this standard, these are the only
exceptions to the general rule of deference.46 That is, the language of
this standard seeks to emphasize that judicial intervention in the
internal decisions of voluntary associations should not be the norm
and instead should only occur when absolutely necessary to prevent a
previously recognized evil. However, as this Recent Development will
argue, the application of this standard by the court of appeals' dissent
is not faithful to a trend of deference to an association's internal
rulemaking function, and therefore resembles something very
different from the deferential majority rule that North Carolina
sought to replicate.4 7
40. See 7 C.J.S. Associations § 82 (2014) ("Generally, courts will not interfere with the
internal affairs of an unincorporated association ... so long as . . .no property or civil
rights are invaded.").
41. Wilson Realty & Constr., Inc. v. Asheboro-Randolph Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 134
N.C. App. 468, 470, 518 S.E.2d 28, 30 (1999) (citing 6 AM. JUR. 2D Associations and
Clubs § 37).
42. Arendas v. N.C. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., - N.C. App. _, -, 718 S.E.2d
198, 199 (2011).
43. Hereafter referred to as the "Topp test."




47. See infra Part III.A, notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
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II. TOPP V. BIG ROCK FOUNDATION, INC.
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Every summer the Crystal Coast Tournament, a voluntary
nonprofit association, holds one of the oldest and largest fishing
tournaments in the country in Morehead City, North Carolina: the
Big Rock Blue Marlin Tournament.4 8 The roots of the Tournament
date back to 1957, when the first informal competition was held.49
Boat crews wishing to participate in the Tournament pay a hefty
entry fee and agree to the Tournament rules.5 The rules require each
member of the crew to hold a highly migratory species fishing permit
("HMS permit") and emphasize the state requirement for a North
Carolina Coastal Recreational Fishing License ("CFRL") for every
crewmember.5' Additionally, the rules empower the Tournament
Rules Committee to disqualify "[a]ny boat breaching any of the
above Tournament Rules" and state that "[d]ecisions of the Rules
Committee and Board of Directors are final."52
The Topp Plaintiffs were members of a fishing crew that
competed in the 2010 Tournament and caught an 883-pound blue
marlin, dwarfing the next biggest catch by over 300 pounds.53 After
catching the marlin, the crew discovered that Wann, the member
responsible for thawing and rigging bait, did not hold a valid CFRL.54
The Tournament Rules Committee learned of this and subjected the
crewmembers to a polygraph test." During the test, Wann eventually
admitted to not holding an active CRFL at the time the marlin was
48. See generally BIG ROCK BLUE MARLIN TOURNAMENT, supra note 9 (providing
general information about the Tournament, including past winners, entry fees, and
Tournament Rules).
49. See Bruce Paul, History, BIG ROCK BLUE MARLIN TOURNAMENT,
http://www.thebigrock.comlhistory (last visited Sept. 5, 2014), for a discussion of the rich
and interesting history of the Tournament and the discovery of marlins along the Crystal
Coast.
50. See Topp, - N.C. App. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 892 (Hunter, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (stating that Plaintiffs paid an entry fee of $18,025); Registration, BIG
ROCK BLUE MARLIN TOURNAMENT, http://www.thebigrock.com/registration (last visited
Sept. 5, 2014) (noting seven levels, ranging from $500 to $5,000 per level).
51. Topp, - N.C. App. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 886; 2013 Official Tournament Rules, BIG
ROCK BLUE MARLIN TOURNAMENT, http://www.thebigrock.com/2013-official-
tournament-rules (last visited Sept. 5, 2014) (outlining 2014 "Tournament Rules,"
including Rule 9, which requires all competitors to hold certain fishing licenses and
permits, and Rule 21, which authorizes the Tournament Rules Committee to make final
decisions regarding compliance with the Tournament Rules).
52. Topp, - N.C. App. at -, 726 S.E.2d at 889 (quoting the 2013 Tournament Rules).
53. See id. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 886.
54. Id. at_, 726 S.E.2d at 886.
55. Id. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 887.
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caught.56 Based on this information, the North Carolina Marine
Fisheries Commission ("MFC") issued Wann a citation." Under the
authority of Rule 20, the Tournament Rules Committee and Board of
Directors found that Wann's failure to possess a valid CFRL at the
time of the catch was a breach of the Tournament Rules and
subsequently disqualified him, and the rest of the crew, from the
Tournament. Consequently, the crew lost the nearly one million
dollar prize reserved for the biggest catch.
In response to the decision, Plaintiffs brought suit against the
Tournament for breach of contract on June 25, 2010, and the prize
money was enjoined from being paid to the second-place and third-
place crews. On January 18, 2011, Defendants moved for summary
judgment, and on March 3, 2011, the superior court granted the
motion and ordered Crystal Coast Tournament to pay the prize
money to the runners-up.' Plaintiffs submitted a timely appeal.6 '
B. The North Carolina Court of Appeals Decision and the Supreme
Court of North Carolina's Subsequent Reversal
On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reviewed the
question de novo, stating that the reviewability of a decision made by
a tournament rules committee is a case of first impression in North
Carolina.62 The Defendants put forth supporting authority from other
jurisdictions, most notably Ohio's articulation in Lough v. Varsity
Bowl, Inc.63 This case, from which the court of appeals modeled its
standard,' involved a dispute between the American Bowling
Congress, a voluntary nonprofit membership association, and some of
its members over whether the association's decision to disqualify the
members from a tournament was in error.65 The Lough court
categorized the issue as a "jurisdictional requirement,"66 and held that
there were no grounds for judicial review where there was no showing
of a violation of due process, "arbitrariness, fraud, or collusion." 67
56. Id. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 887.
57. Id. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 887.
58. Id. at , 726 S.E.2d at 887.
59. Id. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 887.
60. Id. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 887.
61. Id. at , 726 S.E.2d at 887.
62. Id. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 888-89.
63. 243 N.E.2d 61 (Ohio 1968).
64. Topp, - N.C. App. at -, 726 S.E.2d at 889 (quoting Lough, 243 N.E.2d at 63).
65. See Lough, 243 N.E.2d at 62.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 63.
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Persuaded by the Defendants' supporting authority from other
jurisdictions, the Topp majority held that:
[W]here the duly adopted laws of a voluntary association
provide for the final settlement of disputes among its members,
by a procedure not shown to be inconsistent with due process,
its action thereunder is final and conclusive and will not be
reviewed by the courts in the absence of arbitrariness, fraud, or
collusion."8
The North Carolina Court of Appeals defined abuse of
discretion as requiring the decision of the voluntary association to be
"manifestly unreasonable" and "so arbitrary that it could not have
been the result of a reasoned decision."69 The due process exception
found in Lough was also included in the majority's articulation of the
standard; the court required the voluntary association to provide its
members with notice and opportunity consistent with due process of
law.
In applying this newly adopted standard and asking whether
summary judgment was properly granted, the majority emphasized
the existence and clarity of Tournament Rules 9 and 20, which
explicitly required the permits and authorized the Tournament Rules
Committee to disqualify participants for any violation of the rules at
its discretion." Based on this reasoning, the majority concluded that
the Plaintiffs did not present evidence that forecasted a genuine issue
68. Topp, - N.C. App. at -, 726 S.E.2d at 889 (quoting Lough, 243 N.E.2d at 63).
The standard was adopted word for word from Lough.
69. Id. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 889 (citation omitted). The abuse of discretion standard, at
least as articulated in the majority of jurisdictions, has striking similarities to judicial
review of arbitrary and capricious agency decisions. The Supreme Court of North Carolina
stated that when applying the arbitrary and capricious test to agency decisions, "[the
court] may not replace the agency's judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views
of the evidence." White v. N.C. Dept. of Env't., Health, and Natural Res., 117 N.C. App.
545, 547, 451 S.E.2d 376, 378 (1995). Just as the North Carolina Court of Appeals majority
equated the arbitrariness standard for voluntary associations to "an abuse of discretion,"
Topp, - N.C. App. at -, 726 S.E.2d at 889, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has
held that the arbitrary and capricious standard for agencies is "a difficult one to meet" and
"agency decisions may be reversed ... if they are . . . 'whimsical' [or] 'indicate a lack of fair
and careful consideration.' " Lewis v. N.C. Dept. of Human Res., 92 N.C. App. 737, 740,
375 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1989) (quoting Comm'r of Ins. v. Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 420, 269
S.E.2d 547, 573 (1980)). The presence of such a strong analogy is further evidence that the
Supreme Court of North Carolina is straying from the fundamental rationale driving
judicial review of voluntary associations.
70. Topp, - N.C. App. at -, 726 S.E.2d at 889. The majority stated, "Plaintiffs also
presented no evidence that the board did not afford Plaintiffs procedural due process, and,
thus, we hold the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for Defendants."
Id. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 890.
71. Id. at -, 726 S.E.2d at 889-90.
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of material fact and held that there was "no evidence that the board's
decision to disqualify ... for failure to have a CRFL on board was
manifestly unreasonable."7 2 Consequently, the majority affirmed the
trial court's grant of summary judgment for Defendants.73
Although the dissent adopted the same Lough standard as the
majority, its interpretation of the standard varied substantially.
Justice Robert C. Hunter, authoring the dissent, concurred with the
standard, but he concluded that the grant of summary judgment was
in error since there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the decision to disqualify the crew was arbitrary, "resulting in a
breach of the contract between [the crew] and Crystal Coast
Tournament."7 4 The dissent missed the threshold question of whether
judicial intervention was appropriate, or, in other words, whether one
of the four limited exceptions applied. Instead, the dissent skipped
straight to an application of contract principles, conceptualizing the
Plaintiffs as contracting for the prize money and thus being in privity
with Crystal Coast Tournament." Therefore, in the dissent's view, the
Plaintiffs must have materially breached the agreement in order to
terminate Crystal Coast Tournament's obligation to perform its end
of the bargain." In analyzing the materiality of the rules violation, the
dissent applied state contract law, asking whether the breach went to
the "very heart of the agreement" and whether it was "vital to [the
contract's] existence."" According to the dissent, if the breach was
not material, the next question presented to the court would be
whether the breach could be compensated in damages.79 If so, then
the other party must perform.o The dissent emphasized the word
"may" in Rule 20 and imposed a burden on the voluntary association
to consider whether or not the violations were material." Under
North Carolina contract principles, the dissent reasoned that the
72. Id. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 890.
73. Id.
74. Id. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 892 (Hunter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting Long v. Long, 160 N.C. App. 664, 668, 588 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2003)).
78. Id. (quoting Statesville Flour Mills Co. v. Wayne Distrib. Co., 171 N.C. 708, 711,
88 S.E. 771, 773 (1916)).
79. Id. (citing Statesville Flour Mills Co. v. Wayne Distrib. Co., 171 N.C. 708, 712, 88
S.E. 771, 773 (1916)).
80. Id. ("Here, if Wann's failure to possess a CRFL was not a significant violation of
the Tournament Rules, it would not excuse Defendants from their obligations under the
contract.").
81. Id. ("Because the Rules Committee and Board of Directors have discretion in
reaching their decision, it follows that they must consider whether a violation of the rules
is a material violation and what penalty is appropriate.").
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crew's violation was insignificant and could have been addressed with
an alternative penalty, and therefore the Tournament Rules
Committee's disqualification was inappropriate?
After articulating this different interpretation of the Lough
standard, the dissent then applied common law contract principles to
the Tournament Rule Committee's decision." The court asked
whether the breach of the rules afforded the crew any competitive
advantage.' According to the dissent, the lack of a competitive
advantage afforded by Wann's failure to have an active CFRL
created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Tournament
Rules Committee's decision was arbitrary." The dissent also noted
that other prizewinners only held blanket fishing licenses and that the
Tournament registration form did not mention CRFLs. 6 For these
reasons, the dissent stated that it would reverse the grant of summary
judgment for the Defendants and remand the case for further
proceedings to apply this new standard." Although the dissent did not
employ abuse of discretion language, it made a point to state that it
adopted the same standard as the majority."
In 2013, the Supreme Court of North Carolina issued a three-
sentence, per curiam decision that reversed the decision of the court
of appeals "[flor the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion."" After
the case was remanded back to the superior court, the parties
settled.9 0
82. Id. at -, 726 S.E.2d at 892-93.
83. Id. at , 726 S.E.2d at 892 (noting that a breach must be material to be
actionable).
84. Id.
85. Id. at , 726 S.E.2d at 893.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at , 726 S.E.2d at 892.
89. Topp v. Big Rock Found., Inc., _ N.C. _ _, 736 S.E.2d 173, 174 (2013) (per
curiam) ("For the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion, we reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals.").
90. See Jannette Pippin, Nearly $1 Million Marlin Tournament Prize Dispute Settled,
STAR NEWS ONLINE (May 28, 2013, 8:54 AM),
http://www.starnewsonline.com/article/20130528/articles/130529589 ("[The] Tournament
President... confirmed the settlement as did attorneys representing parties on each side
of the case."). The amount of the settlement was kept confidential.
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III. THE NEW TOPP TEST PROVIDES LITTLE GUIDANCE FOR WHEN
LOWER COURTS CAN POLICE THE INTERNAL RULEMAKING
DECISIONS OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS
The Supreme Court of North Carolina's three-sentence adoption
of the dissent creates a standard that is ambiguous and unworkable
for lower courts. Part III.A will address how the court failed to
impose the threshold question of justiciability, which should be the
first step whenever a court is presented with the internal decisions of
a voluntary agency. Next, Part III.B will address the fundamental
differences between treating this initial question, including the
exception of arbitrariness, as a question of law or fact, and calls for
the court to clarify. Part III.C will argue that the "competitive
advantage" rationale employed by the dissent will prove unworkable
across the contexts of different voluntary associations, especially
sports leagues. Finally, the policy implications underlying the Lough
standard will be discussed, and this Recent Development will argue
that the dissent's application of the standard ameliorates all of the
benefits that the standard seeks to impose. Ultimately, regardless of
the test the court wants to adopt in this area, it must clarify the
standard carefully to provide clear guidelines for lower courts.
A. The Supreme Court of North Carolina Missed the Threshold
Question of Justiciability
This subpart breaks down the standard adopted by the Supreme
Court of North Carolina for judicial intervention in a voluntary
association's internal dispute resolution and then compares this
standard to its practical application by the court of appeals' dissent.
Ultimately, the difference between the written standard and its
application is substantial. By affirming the dissent's reasoning, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina has essentially rendered the abuse
of discretion standard meaningless. What is left are empty words, and
lower courts will be left scrambling to put the pieces back together.
The dissent adopted by the Supreme Court of North Carolina
replaced the threshold question of whether courts are permitted to
review a claim with an immediate application of state contract law.91
This application by the dissent stands in complete opposition to the
majority rule, which explicitly delineates the exceptions to the rule of
noninterference: a lack of due process, arbitrariness, fraud, and
91. Topp, - N.C. App. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 892 (Hunter, J. concurring and dissenting
in part).
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collusion.' Without one of these triggering events, a court has no
authority to review an association's internal decision.
Deconstruction of the newly adopted standard is the first step in
its interpretation and application. The standard begins by stating,
"[W]here the duly adopted laws of a voluntary association provide for
the final settlement of disputes among its members . . . ."9 The
presence of this clause is intuitively intentional, the most plausible
explanation being that it contrasts the broader judicial review that
courts are allowed to engage in when the bylaws of a voluntary
association do not provide for final dispute resolution with the limited
exceptions available when the bylaws are unambiguous. When the
governing regulations of a voluntary association are clear, the court
exercises much more limited judicial review and can only intervene
when the voluntary association's decision is arbitrary, fraudulent,
collusive, or not in accordance with due process.9 4 It is
counterintuitive for the court to allow the term "arbitrary" to
function as a window to apply state common law, especially when the
majority analogized the exception to an "abuse of discretion"
standard. 5
By skipping this threshold question of whether the voluntary
association unambiguously provided for final settlement of disputes,
the court of appeals' dissent essentially allows for any internal dispute
decision made by a voluntary agency to raise a genuine issue of
material fact and therefore go to a jury.96 Other jurisdictions have
avoided this circular reasoning altogether by emphasizing the
threshold question of justiciability and defining the "arbitrary"
exception more restrictively to only apply where voluntary
92. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
93. Topp, - N.C. App. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 889 (alteration in original) (quoting Lough
v. Varsity Bowl, Inc., 243 N.E.2d 61, 63 (Ohio 1968)).
94. See McAdoo v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, - N.C. App. _, _, 736 S.E.2d 811,
825 (2013) ("Thus, under the Topp test, when a plaintiff challenges a voluntary
organization's decision, the case will be dismissed as nonjusticiable unless the plaintiff
alleges facts showing (i) the decision was inconsistent with due process, or (ii) the
organization engaged in arbitrariness, fraud, or collusion." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
95. Topp, - N.C. App. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 889 (referring to the Topp test as an
"abuse of discretion" standard); McAdoo, _ N.C. App. at _, 736 S.E.2d at 826 ("Abuse
of discretion results where the court's ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so
arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision." (quoting State v.
Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988) (internal quotation marks
omitted))).
96. The ease of raising a genuine issue of material fact defeats the entire purpose of
the discretionary standard; in these circumstances, judicial intervention is encouraged, not
limited.
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associations make decisions that conflict with their own bylaws or
regulations.'
The result is a standard that is not discretionary at all.
Tournament Rule 20 is unambiguous: "Any boat breaching any of the
above Tournament Rules may be disqualified .... Decisions of the
Rules Committee and Board of Directors are final."98 There is no
ambiguity in this provision that the court needed to reconcile; it
simply reserved discretion to the Tournament Rules Committee to
disqualify any crew for violation of the agreed upon rules." There are
numerous potential reasons why the Crystal Coast Tournament
wanted to adopt a flexible provision, including to prevent unjust
decisions and to be able to take into account all the surrounding facts
and circumstances." But the association's rationale is irrelevant here.
Instead, the unambiguous intent of the voluntary association to
reserve final disqualification for rule violations should have been a
red flag to the courts to exercise limited review and not to apply
common law contract principles unless there was a clear showing that
at least one of the exceptions applied. By allowing the arbitrariness
exception to apply in any instance where the court disagrees with an
internal decision of an association, the court completely obliterated
this fundamental limitation on judicial review and instead transferred
the decision-making powers from associations to triers of fact.
Finally, the dissent's application of the standard rendered the
majority's analogy to an "abuse of discretion" standard
meaningless. 10 In setting forth the standard, the majority equated this
limited form of review with an "abuse of discretion" inquiry,
requiring the decision of the voluntary association to be "manifestly
97. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass'n v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 590 P.2d 401, 403 (Cal. 1979)
(defining one limited example of when the court can interfere in the internal rulemakings
of voluntary associations as when an association "plainly contravenes the terms of its
bylaws").
98. Topp, - N.C. App. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 889 (quoting Tournament Rule 20).
99. Id. at , 726 S.E.2d at 889 ("Rule 20 stated, 'Any boat breaching any of the above
Tournament Rules may be disqualified, except as previously stated. Decisions of the Rules
Committee and Board of Directors are final.' ").
100. Indeed, in defending its decision to disqualify the Plaintiffs based on Wann's
failure to hold an active recreational fishing license, the Tournament Director asserted,
"There will be some lessons learned from this one." Lee Tolliver, Big Rock Fishing
Tourney Decision: Team Citation Disqualified, PILOTONLINECOM (June 23, 2010),
http://hamptonroads.com/2010/06/big-rock-fishing-tourney-decision-team-citation-
disqualified.
101. Topp, - N.C. App. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 889.
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unreasonable."" The dissent also adopted this standard, but did not
use "abuse of discretion" language in the opinion. Instead, the dissent
held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
Crystal Coast Tournament's decision was arbitrary and favored
remanding the issue back to the lower court.o" This issue is very
nuanced. The dissent was not explicitly substituting its judgment for
that of the voluntary association but was instead allowing a jury to
substitute its judgment as to whether it thinks that the internal rule
maker made the right decision. But just because the court is
considering these internal decisions as questions of fact does not
make this form of review permissible. Regardless of the
characterization of the issue as a question or law or fact, the problem
is still the same: the autonomy of the association is diminished. This
clearly points to a nondeferential standard, a standard that stands in
complete contradiction when applied to the rule allegedly adopted.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina needs to speak to exactly what
arbitrariness means in the context of voluntary associations, including
whether the standard reaches the level of an abuse of discretion, or
whether courts-or juries-are able to substitute their own reasoned
judgment for that of the voluntary association. Without this guidance,
lower courts can intervene freely, and predictability will decline.
B. The Supreme Court of North Carolina Turns a Question of Law
into a Question of Fact
In addition to missing the threshold question of justiciability, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina also did not confirm whether lower
courts should treat arbitrariness of a voluntary association's decision
as a question of law or fact. This distinction is critical for promoting
certainty of the law and controlling the flow of litigation in lower
courts. The majority of the North Carolina Court of Appeals referred
to determinations of exceptions as "question[s] of law."" This
implies that judges can make determinations as to when an internal
decision is reviewable, promoting predictability by allowing judges,
102. Id. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 889 (citing White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d
829, 833 (1985) (defining "manifestly unreasonable" as "so arbitrary that it could not have
been the result of a reasoned decision").
103. See id. at , 726 S.E.2d at 893 (Hunter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("I would also hold that... Plaintiffs raised a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether their disqualification from the Big Rock Blue Marlin Tournament was arbitrary
and thus a material breach of the parties' contract.").
104. Id. at -, 726 S.E.2d at 889 (majority opinion) ("Whether a board's decision is to
be disturbed due to arbitrariness, fraud, or collusion is a question of law." (citation
omitted)).
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rather than juries, to make informed decisions based on solid,
deferential guidelines. The dissent purported to adopt the same
standard but, in applying the standard, concluded that there was a
"genuine issue of material fact" in the materiality of the Plaintiff's
violation of the rules.'os
The difference between a question of law and fact is critical for
predictability. Instead of adopting a deferential standard that allows
voluntary associations to function independently from the judicial
branch, the Supreme Court of North Carolina brought a new actor
into play: the jury. The parties' decision to settle before a jury
determined the "genuine issue of material fact""o6 is persuasively
generalizable to future parties in similar positions. Given the
application of contract principles and the malleable concept of
materiality, it is difficult for either party to predict what the ultimate
outcome of the dispute will be. Rendering the question of
arbitrariness a question of law and articulating the standard for
judicial review clearly and concisely would promote a more
predictable and stable system."7 Either way, the difference is critical
for the stability of our court system, and the Supreme Court of North
Carolina has implicitly and ambiguously adopted a standard that
lends itself to determination by a jury, under the guise of a "question
of law."0 s
C. Problems Inherent in Relying on "Competitive Advantage" for
Determining Material Breach by Voluntary Associations
Another major problem in the application of the standard
adopted by the court is that lower courts will likely feel compelled to
105. Id. at -, 726 S.E.2d at 893 (Hunter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
106. Id.
107. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1182 (1989) ("[Wle should recognize that at the point where an appellate judge says that
the remaining issue must be decided [as a question of fact], he begins to resemble a finder
of fact more than a determiner of law.... And to reiterate the unfortunate practical
consequences of reaching such a pass when there still remains a good deal of judgment to
be applied: equality of treatment is difficult to demonstrate and, in a multi-tiered judicial
system, impossible to achieve; predictability is destroyed; judicial arbitrariness is
facilitated; judicial courage is impaired."). Additionally, adopting and clarifying the
standard to coincide with the majority of jurisdictions, or, in other words, actually applying
the new Topp test as an abuse of discretion standard, would bring the test in line with the
laws governing judicial intervention into agency decisions and thus create even more
coherency in the justiciability of internal decisions of voluntary associations by giving
parties another body of case law-case law from other jurisdictions-to supplement the
scarce and conflicting precedent. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
108. Topp, _ N.C. App. at -, 726 S.E.2d at 889 (referring to the question of
arbitrariness as "a question of law").
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apply the "competitive advantage"" rationale across different types
of voluntary associations. McAdoo v. University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill"o presents the perfect example of the problem inherent in
the application of this reasoning. McAdoo is the only North Carolina
case to quote the Topp test."' When the NCAA disqualified
McAdoo, a football player at the University of North Carolina, for
academic dishonesty, he challenged the decision in court, claiming
arbitrariness.11 2 Although the North Carolina Court of Appeals did
not apply the Topp test because it held that McAdoo lacked standing
after he signed with the Baltimore Ravens, the court still articulated
the standard as an "abuse of discretion" standard, implying that the
Topp test would have been applied but for McAdoo's lack of injury.113
Although the standard was not applied to the NCAA in
McAdoo, it is clear that such an application would have led to absurd
results. First, application of the Topp dissent would force every state
court to review decisions by associations like the NCAA, which
govern competitive events, with an eye towards a "competitive
advantage."'14 Permanently excluding a student-athlete member from
the association based on noncompetitive reasons, such as academic
dishonesty, would suggest a lack of materiality under the Topp
dissent's analysis. These determinations of nonmateriality would
leave voluntary associations with a complete lack of power to enforce
these noncompetitive, yet vital aspects of the associations' internal
functionings, which cannot possibly be the correct result.
One response to the argument that the competitive advantage
rationale is unworkable is that sports leagues like the NCAA might
have a broader, deeper, overarching purpose in comparison to a
voluntary association that functions primarily to operate a single
tournament. Indeed, the NCAA asserts the goals of "advancing
academics," "providing opportunities," "developing life skills," and
"enhancing communities" as its common goals."' However, it is
equally as problematic for a court to be responsible for defining the
109. Id. at -, 726 S.E.2d at 892 (Hunter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)("Plaintiffs' violation of the Tournament Rules did not afford the Plaintiffs any
competitive advantage.").
110. _ N.C. App. -, 736 S.E.2d 811 (2013).
111. Id. at _, 736 S.E.2d at 825-26.
112. Id. at -, 736 S.E.2d at 825.
113. Id. at _, 736 S.E.2d at 826.
114. Topp, - N.C. App. at -, 726 S.E.2d at 892 (Hunter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
115. See The Value of College Sports, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-
athletes/value-college-sports (last visited Sept. 5, 2014) (describing the various goals of the
NCAA and providing information on each).
2138 [Vol. 92
2014] VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS & THE TOPP TEST 2139
often ambiguous boundaries of a voluntary association's defined
purpose, including deciding if a certain violation is within the stated
purpose. The basic policy behind this deferential standard is to let
voluntary associations decide how to function independently, without
judicial interference."' By imposing contract law at the threshold
issue of justiciability, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has
effectively eliminated every benefit that the noninterference standard
is designed to promote.
D. The Dissent's Application of the Standard Stands in Stark
Opposition to the Policy Reasons for Adopting the Deferential
Standard
Yet another indication that the standard adopted by the
Supreme Court of North Carolina differs from the Lough test is that
the policy reasons traditionally used to defend the standard are in
complete opposition to the application of the Topp test by the dissent.
There are a few general policy reasons that are commonly asserted by
other jurisdictions to defend deference to the internal decisions of
associations. These policy justifications include maintaining an
association's autonomy, respecting its expertise, and minimizing the
burden of litigation on state courts and the associations."' Although
jurisdictions use slightly different wording to describe these policies,
and some place special interest on certain rationales, there are
general themes of judicial competency, freedom of contract, and cost
concerns.
The dissent's application of the Lough standard conflicts with
these policies in several ways. By allowing arbitrariness to be judged
by principles of contract law, the dissent creates a loophole for
judicial review. This completely undermines the rationale to minimize
judicial costs, since every voluntary association's decision is now
reviewable, regardless of whether the provisions are unambiguous.
Additionally, by skipping the threshold question of justiciability, an
116. Indeed, this type of judicial second-guessing is exactly what the standard seeks to
avoid by giving deference to the entity that is deemed to have the greatest expertise and
thus the best knowledge for deciding whether a member has broken the rules. See
Oakland Raiders v. Nat'l Football League, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 266, 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
("Given the unique and specialized nature of this association's business-the operation of
a professional football league-there is significant danger that judicial intervention in such
disputes will have the undesired and unintended effect of interfering with the League's
autonomy in matters where the NFL and its commissioner have much greater competence
and understanding than the courts." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
117. See id.
118. Id.
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association's autonomy is far from respected. To the contrary, the
standard as applied by the Supreme Court of North Carolina removes
the decision-making power from the association and places it in the
hands of the jury. Moreover, the dissent's finding of a genuine issue of
material fact also allows the jury to review the internal rulemakings of
an association, which even further decreases predictability. This will
almost certainly drain voluntary associations, which often operate for
charitable purposes, through huge litigation costs and settlements. 119
The fact that the common policy justifications for the Lough
standard-the standard adopted by the Supreme Court of North
Carolinal 2 0-are contradicted by the dissent's application of the
standard is yet another reason why clarification is desperately needed.
Without more guidance, lower courts will be left to transfer the
decision-making abilities to the jury, and will therefore promote the
opposite of all of the policy justifications that the standard seeks to
protect.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The confusing state of the law on voluntary associations strongly
calls for clarification, especially since voluntary associations are
abundant, and they play a vital role in the economy and promotion of
communities.121 The voluntary association, its constituent members,
and their representing lawyers should be able to predict how and
when a court can intervene in the internal decision-making processes
of the voluntary association and whether such an intervention will be
decided by a judge or a jury. As law currently stands in North
Carolina, none of these key players will be able to come close to a
reliable prediction. At best, lawyers may hope to raise a genuine issue
of material fact that will go a jury, where the outcome will be
systematically difficult to predict. Based on the rationale asserted by
the court of appeals' dissent in Topp, creating this issue of material
fact will not be difficult-even when there is an agreement that
specifically governs the issue by giving discretion to the voluntary
association. The dissent's decision to impose a materiality standard-
a question of fact-further muddles this standard. This uncertainty
119. See Scalia, supra note 107.
120. Topp v. Big Rock Found., Inc., _ N.C. _, _, 736 S.E.2d 173, 174 (2013) (per
curiam) ("For the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion, we reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals.").
121. For example, the Tournament raises money for a wide variety of charities and has
contributed over three million dollars to these charities. See Charities, BIG ROCK BLUE MARLIN
TOURNAMENT, http://www.thebigrock.com/charities (last visited Sept. 5, 2014) ("The tournament
is very proud of its past contributions totaling $3,133,216 after the 2013 tournament.").
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will create more litigation than necessary and has the potential to
drain many of the nonprofit voluntary associations that add to the
rich and charitable culture of North Carolina.
Given the uncertainty resulting from these opinions, this Part
provides three recommendations. First, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina should provide more guidance to lower courts that are
seeking to apply the new Topp test. Second, but not completely
distinct, the court should also make sure to answer the question of
whether the application of the exceptions is a question of law or fact.
Finally, much of the confusion in the application of the Topp test has
centered on the type of voluntary association at issue. For this reason,
the third subpart will discuss the possible solution of distinguishing
between different types of voluntary associations, and creating
different applications for each.
A. Leading Lower Courts Step-by-Step: The Supreme Court of North
Carolina Should Provide Clear Guidance in the Application of the
New Topp Test to Promote Consistency and Certainty Among
Lower Courts
The Supreme Court needs to explicitly delineate the step-by-step
application of the Topp test. The majority of jurisdictions have
adopted this deferential rule for justiciability for sound policy
reasons, policy reasons that the Supreme Court of North Carolina
and the North Carolina Court of Appeals' dissent must have
considered as persuasive when choosing to affirmatively adopt the
standard. The first step when a court is presented with the
opportunity to review an internal decision by a voluntary association
should always be to ask whether the matter is justiciable. That is, the
court should ask whether it is being called on to interpret a contract,
or if the contract is clear on the matter in dispute. If the contract is
ambiguous, the court is allowed to determine that it is being called on
to interpret the contract, and should apply state contract principles
freely. This is in line with the deferential standard, with its roots in
Lough, and is also in line with state precedent. 122 If, on the other
122. In North Carolina, a contract is ambiguous if "the language... is fairly and
reasonably susceptible to either of the constructions asserted by the parties." Bicket v.
McLean Sec., Inc., 124 N.C. App. 548, 553, 478 S.E.2d 518, 521 (1996) (quoting Glover v.
First Union Nat'l Bank, 109 N.C. App. 451, 456, 428 S.E.2d 206, 209 (1993)). If the
contract is deemed to be ambiguous, and the "intention of the parties is unclear,
interpretation of the contract is for the jury." Int'l Paper Co. v. Corporex Constructors,
Inc., 96 N.C. App. 312, 317, 385 S.E.2d 553, 556 (1989). If the contract governing the
Tournament were ambiguous, the dissent's application of the Topp test would have been
in line with case law and the Lough standard. The issue here is that the Tournament Rules
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hand, the contract clearly speaks to the matter being reviewed, the
court should end its inquiry and grant summary judgment for the
party not seeking to overturn the decision barring a few, specified
exceptions.
Articulating this process should not be too difficult, since the
court in Topp v. Big Rock Found., Inc. has already delineated four
such exceptions: when the association's decision is arbitrary,
fraudulent, collusive, or if the association did not afford the member
due process. 1" But the court needs to define each exception explicitly,
so as not to allow for genuine issues of material fact that will
subsequently allow every claim to go to a jury. If the court does want
to equate a reservation of discretion by the voluntary association to
determine its own internal matters to an imposition that the same
voluntary association follow state contract law, the court needs to do
so explicitly. This conclusion is in complete opposition to any form of
the standard in other jurisdictions and also seems to contradict the
adopted, deferential language. 24
B. Reducing the Heavy Burden of Litigation Costs and Settlement by
Separating Questions of Law from Questions of Fact
Another way that the court can avoid imposing such a heavy
burden on voluntary associations and the court system is by clearly
articulating whether the threshold question of justiciability is a
question of law or fact. Normally, a question of fact arises when there
are credibility determinations-for example, where the parties give
conflicting accounts of facts determinative to the outcome. But, where
the answer to the inquiry can be found in the law, the examination is
better left to the judge. In the particular case of reviewing the internal
decisions of voluntary associations, a judge is in a better position to
determine whether a decision is arbitrary, especially when the present
state of the law is so confusing, and there is a unanimous consensus
that promoting the stability and autonomy of voluntary associations is
good for the state.
By articulating a clear standard, judges will be able to decide
these questions of law more easily, and this will both foster stability
were clear-they unambiguously stated that any violation of the rules was grounds for
disqualification, and all decisions made by the Tournament were final. Topp, - N.C. App.
at _, 726 S.E.2d at 889.
123. See supra Part II.B.
124. See, e.g., Oakland Raiders v. Nat'l Football League, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 266, 284 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2005) (describing the rationale of a court that adopted the Lough standard as
being primarily to protect the autonomy of associations and making sure to factor this
underlying policy into judicial intervention).
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and promote voluntary associations.'" For example, a lower court
presented with the reviewability of a voluntary association's decision
armed only with the Topp test as it stands today will be much more
likely to send question of arbitrariness, or materiality, to a jury than if
there was a clearer standard for a question of law. If, on the other
hand, a lower court judge were instructed that the threshold question
of justiciability is a question of law, and such reviewability is limited
only in the case of a voluntary association's "abuse of discretion," 126
the judge would confidently be able to dismiss a case, notwithstanding
a conflict in the determinative facts between the parties. The latter
approach will promote a stable and predictable legal system, and will
remove the heavy burden that the dissent's new Topp test has put on
voluntary associations and the North Carolina judicial system.
C. Differentiating Between Different Types of Voluntary
Associations, and Tailoring the Topp Test to Each
Finally, it might be the case that the Supreme Court of North
Carolina wants to apply different standards of justiciability to
different types of voluntary associations. This would explain why the
court affirmed the dissent, including its "competitive advantage"
reasoning, even though this reasoning proves to be incredibly
problematic in different contexts." The court may want to carve out
some situations, like where a member is specifically involved in the
association for the purpose of contracting for prize money, where a
higher level of fairness should be given to members or where greater
regulations are necessary. Such a differentiation might be based on
the intuition that it is not fair to distinguish between a tournament
run by a voluntary association and one that is not. Another possible
rationale is that courts should have a greater role in regulating
contests that deal with prizes and money than in regulating sports
teams, political parties, or homeowner's associations, which are more
private. If this is the case, the court needs to explicitly delineate these
contexts and articulate the different standards of judicial review for
each. If it is not the case, the court still needs to rectify the conflicting
rationales and provide guidelines for lower courts to apply the Topp
test, including the reasoning articulated by the North Carolina Court
of Appeals' dissent across different contexts. Even more so, the court
125. See generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
27 (2010) ("[Rules] are inspired by the same yearning for consistency, for certainty, for
uniformity of plan and structure.").
126. Topp, - N.C. App. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 826.
127. See supra Part II.C and notes 107-114.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
needs to redact the "abuse of discretion"128 language to avoid
confusion, unpredictability, and instability amongst lower courts. The
court must either limit the weight of this language or confine it to its
proper application.
CONCLUSION
As the law stands now, judicial intervention into the internal
decision-making of voluntary associations in North Carolina is up in
the air. By affirming the dissent's markedly different articulation of
the Lough standard, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has
created a new rule that is in complete opposition to the standard it
claimed to adopt. This new Topp test purports to be deferential to
voluntary associations but actually creates a loophole by which courts
are not required to ask the threshold question of whether to
intervene; instead, courts can immediately apply contract principles
that will almost always create a genuine issue of material fact, thereby
sending the dispute to a jury. Regardless of its position, the court
desperately needs to articulate clear and workable standards for
lower courts to apply. These standards should be in accordance with
the underlying policies behind the Lough standard and should
promote predictability and stability. If the court wants to employ
stricter judicial review in the context of tournaments, it needs to do so
explicitly. The reliance on the competitive advantage rationale will
prove to be problematic and unworkable, especially considering the
abundance of sports leagues that comprise voluntary associations.
Additionally, the court needs to clearly announce whether the limited
exception of arbitrariness is a question of law or fact and,
consequently, whether these important questions of judicial review
should go to a jury or to the judge. Voluntary associations are too
integral to our society and economy to leave these important
questions unanswered.
LUCILLE C. ANDRZEJEWSKI
128. Topp, - N.C. App. at , 726 S.E.2d at 826.
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